Why does Rousseau say that individuals sometimes must “be forced to be free”? do you agree?
Explain Rousseau’s distinction (spelled out in footnote 3 to part 1 of the inequality essay) between egotism [amour-propre] and self-respect [amour de soi-meme].
According to Burke, why does knowing the extent of any danger reduce its fearsomeness? do you agree? When we lack such knowledge and find the thing we fear “obscure” as in the example from Paradise Lost, can we still say that our fear has a particular object or are we just indeterminately fearful? the latter seems unlikely since Burke cites very specific examples of fearsome obscurity: political despots and death. So how can we know the identity of a fearsome thing without compromising the obscurity that makes it fearsome? Is there a paradox here?
How does Zizek argue that forced choice is not totalitarian, whereas to lay claim to a freedom beyond coercion is “psychotic”? He argues that both love and guilt have this paradoxical structure of 1) not being causally retraceable to any free act or choice on our part, but rather being determined for us as if in advance, and yet 2) being nonetheless authentically expressive of us. How does this argument work?
Zizek says that Hegel is more Kantian than Kant because Hegel takes Kant’s theory of the sublime more literally than Kant did. Specifically, Hegel sticks more resolutely to the principle that there is no “thing in itself” beyond its representation. Why does this imply for Zizek that the “appearance without essence,” or “appearance qua appearance,” “must embody itself in some miserable, radically contingent corporeal leftover”?
What does de Bolla mean by saying that “aesthetics invented art” (20)?
Explain Kant’s distinction between determinate and reflective judgment.
What does de Bolla mean by “the virtual feeling that an artwork knows“? (26) What and how does an artwork know? This is the central question addressed in the essay and de Bolla’s best answer comes in the final two paragraphs, although determining the meaning of what he says here will still take significant work: “the particular quality of an encounter with art is our coming to understand what we cannot live, what is outside the domain of experience. Yet such encounters feel as if they open a terrain, give onto a clearing in which something like experience seems to happen. But not to us, not as part of a continuum of our senses of being, but through us, as if the work itself marks us, touches us….The materiality of an art response is the virtual sensation of the artwork as a way of knowing. I cannot live that response as an experience, but this does not imply that the experience cannot happen through me….[A]rt is both unknowable and the cause for our experiencing different ways of knowing….[I]t holds out the prospect of knowing otherwise” (35).
What is “the central problem faced by both pre- and post-Kantian theories of art and aesthetics” (26)?
De Bolla says that Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment “proposes a radical subjectivity [whose] singularity is capable of being shared in common” (26)’, and that this is both “disinterested’ (27) and directs us toward “the ultimate route to freedom” (28). How does Kant resolve these apparent contradictions?